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THE STATUS OF CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY
ADMINISTRATION IN KENTUCKY
Is it too bold to announce that in a bankruptcy administra-
tion in the Federal Courts in Kentucky, that the line drawn by
the Kentucky Courts, between creditors antecedent and subse-
quent, to the execution and delivery of an unrecorded chattel
mortgage, will be disregarded! That is, that an unrecorded
chattel mortgage which is not good against subsequent creditors
without notice, will also fail against antecedent creditors,
whether or not such antecedent creditors have secured any
equity in the mortgaged property by way of attachment, execu-
tion, levy, or the like. From our study of the situation, we are
constrained to take this position.
In view of the decisions of the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky, and the decisions of the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, our position, at first blush, may
seem somewhat startling, but a careful reading of the State and
Federal cases, we think, will sustain our views.
There can be no doubt that the rule in Kentucky is now,
and has been for more than half a century last past, that an
unrecorded mortgage is not good against subsequent creditors
without notice, but is good against all antecedent creditors who
have not secured some equity in the property at some time prior
to the recording of the mortgage.
It is almost needless for us to sustain this pronouncement
of the Kentucky rule by the citation of authorities, but some of
the more recent Kentucky cases on this subject are:
Mason & Moody v. Scruggs, 207 Ky. 66.
Evans v. Wheeler, 208 Ky. 1.
Stone v. Keith, 218 Ky. 11.
Goodin & Barney Coal Cro., v. Southern Elkhorn. Coal Co., 219 Ky.
827.
Farmers Bank v. Kinslow, 221 Ky. 627.
Sears v. Cane, 242 Ky. 702.
It .will be remembered that Section 496 of the Kentucky
Statutes, often referred to as the Kentucky Recording Act, was
amended- in 1916. Prior to the amendment, that Section pro-
vided that-
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."No deed, or deed of trust, or mortgage, conveying a legal or
equitable title tb real or personal estate shall be valid against a pur-
chaser for valuable consideration, without notice thereof, or against
creditors, until such deed or mortgage shall be acknowledged or proved
according to law and lodged for record."
This Section was amended in 1916 by the addition of the
following :-
"The word creditors as used herein, shall include all creditors ir-
respective of whether or not they have acquired a lien by legal or
equitable proceedings or by voluntary conveyance."
As shown by the above cited Kentucky authorities, the
Court of Appeals has continued to construe the Section, as
amended, with reference to creditors, in the same manner as the
Section had been construed prior thereto, that is, to divide
"all" creditors into the two classes, namely, subsequent creditors
without notice, and antecedent creditors who have failed to ob-
tain some equity in the mortgaged property.
It is interesting to'note that this Section (496) as amended
in 1916, reached the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit for construction, prior to the time it reached
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
The case in which the Section as amended was construed by
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, is the case of In re
Duker Avenue Meat Market, 2. F. (2d) 1699, 5 A. B. R.
(N. S.) 407, in which the Federal Appellate Court held that
the amendment of 1916 to Section 496, was intended to and did
wipe out the distinction between antecedent and subsequent
creditors in Kentucky, and held that the rights of the trustee
in bankruptcy of the mortgagor, were superior to the rights of
the mortagee who held the unrecorded mortgage at the time
of bankruptcy, basing its opinion upon its construction of the
amended statute to the effect that "all" creditors meant "all"
creditors. As above suggested, at the time that the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals decided the Duker Avenue
Meat Market case, the Kentucky Recording Act as amended had
not reached the Kentucky Court of Appeals for construction.
Shortly after the determination of the Duker Avenue Meat
Market case, Section 496, as amended, reached the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Mason and Moody v.
Scruggs, and the Court of Appeals, although the Statute' had
been amended, continued to adhere to its construction of the
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recoiding statute, prior to the amendment, and held: that "all
creditors" in the statute meant subsequent creditors without
notice of the unrecorded mortgage, and such antecedent cred-
itors as had secured some equity in the property at some time
prior to the recording of the mortgage. This construction, of
course, was not in harmony with the holding of the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals in the Duker case.
The question went back to the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals again in the later case of In re Frost, 12 F. (2d),
page 1, and even though the Mason and Moody v. Scruggs case
had been decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the Fed-
eral Court did not find it necessary to depart from its ruling in
the Duker Avenue case, because the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy in the Frost case before the mortgage was recorded,
gave to the trustee in bankruptcy, representing antecedent
creditors of the mortgagor, the necessary equity in the property,
at some time prior to the recording of the mortgage, the Fed-
eral Court bringing into play the 1910 amendment to Section 47
of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U. S. C. A., Section 75), which
amendment placed the trustee in bankruptcy on the footing of
a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings.
At-any rate, the Frost case follows very fine lines of dis-
tinction in order not to overrule the prior Duker Avenue case
in the same Court, and yet remain within the ruling of the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Mason and Moody v. Scruggs.
Then followed the last case in the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals construing this same Section of the Kentucky
Statutes (496) as amended in 1916, in which last case, to-wit,
In re Gibson (65 F. (2d) 921-21 A. B. R. (N. S.) 408), the
Appellate Federal Court, in the light of the many cases on this
subject that had reached the Kentucky Court of Appeals since
the Duker Avenue case, modified and overruled the Duker
Avenue and the Frost cases, in so far as they might be in coi-
fiet with the determination of the subject by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals.
In taking the position that it did in the Gibson case, the
Appellate Federal Court, it appears, followed the well known
rule of construction to the effect that the Federal Courts will, as
nearly as possible, adopt such construction of State statutes as
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is given such statutes by the respective State Courts of last
resort.
It would seem then that in an administration in bankruptcy
in the Federal Courts in Kentucky, where a claim is filed by
the holder of an unrecorded mortgage, seeking priority in dis-
tribution, that we are met with the task of classifying creditors
either as antecedent or subsequent to the execution and delivery
of the unrecorded mortgage, in order to determine their rights
in the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property unless
such classification is wiped out in a bankruptcy proceeding.
That such classification of creditors in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding is disregarded, irrespective of the State law on the sub-
ject, appears to have been concluded by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Moore, Trustee, v. Bay, 284
U. S., page 4, 18 A. B. R. (N. S.) page 675.
The facts in the Moore v. Bay case are that the bankrupt
had executed a chattel mortgage which was admitted to be bad
as against creditors who were such at the date of the mortgage,
and those who became such between the date of the mortgage
and the date on which the mortgage was recorded, there having
been a failure to observe certain requirements of a California
statute. This case went to the Supreme Court on certiorari from
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Both the
District Court in California, and the Circuit Court of Appeals,
following the State Court of last resort in California, had held
that the mortgage was bad as against certain creditors of the
bankrupt, but good as against another class of creditors,, and
therefore, the rights of the mortgagee were prior to the rights
of those creditors against whom the mortgage was good under.
the State laws.
The Supreme Court in reversing the California Federal
Courts said :-
"The trustee in bankruptcy gets the title to all property which
has been transferred by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors or which
prior to the petition he could by any means have transferred or which
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against
him. Act of July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. at L. 565, chap. 541, Sec. 70, U. S. C.
title 11, Sec. 110. By Sec. 67, U. S. 0. title 11, Sec. 107 (a), claims
which for want of record or for other reasons would not have been
valid liens as against the claims of creditors of the bankrupt shall
mot be liens against his estate. The rights of the Trustee by subro-
gation are to be enforced for the benefit of the estate. The Circuit
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Courts of Appeals seem generally to agree, as the language of the
Bankruptcy Act appears to us to imply very plainly, that what thus
is recovered for the benefit of the estate is to be distributed in "divi-
dends of an equal per centum on all allowed claims, except such as
have priority or are secured."
If, as the Supreme Court says, that what thus is recovered
for the benefit of the estate is to be distributed in dividends of
an equal per eentum on all allowed claims, except such as have
priority, or are secured, then when an estate comes on to be
administered in bankruptcy in the Federal Courts in Kentucky,
and the trustee in bankruptcy takes such assets as a subsequent
creditor without notice, is not the distinction between subse-
quent and antecedent creditors wiped out in the bankruptcy ad-
ministration, and do not the creditors share ratably so far as
the unrecorded mortgage is concerned?.
It'would appear that the Supreme Court has answered this
question in the affirmative, when it says that the dividends of an
equal per centum are to be distributed on all allowed claims
except such as have priority or are secured. The priority re-
ferred to necessarily means the priority in distribution in every
bankruptcy case, that is, costs, taxes, wage claims, and the like;
and the secured claims referred to must be claims secured by
mortgages or pledges that meet legal requirements, and claims
secured by statutory liens.
Since the Moore v. Bay ease was decided by the Supreme
Court, the principal therein ennunciated, to the effect that the
rights of the trustee are to be enforced for the benefit of all of
the creditors, has been followed in the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in the case of In re Lewis Compaviy, 62
F. (2d) 353, 22 A. B. R. (N. S.) 427, and by Federal District
Courts in Oklahoma, the Southern Distrio of New York, and
in the Southern District of California.
The administration of bankruptcy estates in Kentucky, en-
cumbered by chattel mortgage liens, has furnished an interest-
ing study since the passage of the Bankruptcy Act in 1898, and
especially has the rule in Kentucky distinguishing between an-
tecedent and subsequent creditors given rise to many difficulties
in such administrations. Shall we hope that the Supreme
Court's decision in Moore v. Bay, has solved the problem and
relieved a trustee in bankruptcy, in administering his trust
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estate, from the Kentucky antecedent and subsequent creditor
rule.
. A. SACHS, JR.
Attorney at Law,
Louisville, Ky.
